

ABSTRACT
of the Habilitation Thesis

The focus on the problem of knowledge was in the very core of my researches even before my Ph.D thesis, therefore the investigation of Kant's philosophy in the process of preparing my thesis was in fact one of its *consequences*. Grounded in the fundamental ideas of my thesis (*Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Possibility of Transcendental Arguments*, 2006) – also embodied in studies and papers published during 2006 after – my first book (*The Experiment of Pure Reason. The Kantian Deduction of Categories*) was published at the end of the year 2010. Both my concern with the problem of knowledge and the investigation of Kant's project from the *Critique of Pure Reason* had unavoidably led me to the German philosopher's categorial model – underlying structure of his monumental theoretical work (the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A and B editions).

In order to facilitate the task of those interested in the topic and to uphold approaching Kant's thought in general, in the foreword of my book *The Experiment...* I had distinguished between two main accounts: the historical-exegetical one and the theoretical reconstruction. Then, I had attempted to achieve – *for the very first time, at least in the Romanian Kantian exegetics* – an unifying outline of these two approaches, that was intended to address and to disclose both Kant's presumed intentions and particularly the possibilities, the huge potential of theoretical reconstruction nowadays. We consider our account to be one of the main original and outstanding contributions to Kantian exegetics (at least in Romania).

Therefore, in this respect, the major issue in Kant's *Critique* may also be solved by trying to understand as deeply as possible both Kant's own reasons (stated or not) for writing a second edition of his CRP (the first edition in 1781, the second edition in 1787), and moreover the theoretical meaning and *particularly* the eventual solutions of some issues of the *Critique* in general; more precisely, to what extent had the second edition clarified, specified, modified the theory of the first edition, and solved some of its problems, and especially how may we address these modifications in the B edition from the *standpoint of a valid reconstruction of Kant's project that also meets the historical-exegetical issues?*

The success of our work had two advantages: on one hand, it meets the historical-exegetical approach, uncovering Kant *to himself*, so to speak – the account on the *Critique* would tell us mainly „what the author himself would have intended to say”, only somehow differently; on the other hand, through re-considering some essential parts (particularly the *metaphysical* deduction and the *transcendental* deduction of the categories) what we can get is not only a more coherent kantian view, but also a validation of his theory in general.

Our account manages to solve the difficulties of the deduction in B, to clarify the theoretical status of the deduction in A (as pertaining to a „second order theory”), and to justify once more the status of the *CRP* in general as a „frame-theory”. Thus, it follows that: the theory of *CRP* does not provide an answer to scepticism (for it is at a higher level of generality and abstraction), is not *directly* related to its contemporary science (for it is at a different level of generality), and therefore it does not fall nor stand together with the invalidation of some „up-to-date” theory of physics. That is the reason why it is neither a „Copernican revolution” nor a „Copernican overthrow”, for with Kant *subjective – objective* acquire a new meaning, distinctive from all traditional ones. Kant had rather *redesigned* our way of approaching object and objectivity, and what science, scientific character, or scientific rationality might be. Their objectivity (i.e., their scientific character) lies in what constitutes Kant’s ultimate novelty – that is, we have *a priori* knowledge due to the fact that we have *a priori* intuition (through space and time as pure *a priori* forms). In other words, the objectivity in question here is no longer the objectivity as the whole pre-Kantian tradition had understood it, but one directly dependent on our consciousness and will – i.e., the objectivity that we are capable of in the process of knowledge.

Thereby, the relation between *The Experiment of Pure Reason ...* and other of my subsequent or even previous studies becomes more clear. In order to preserve a certain coherence of the content, we shall address them mainly systematically, although there is yet a (dominant) chronological development of our approach on Kantian issues and epistemological issues in general.

In our paper *Some Methodological Aspects towards an Interpretation in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, I am developing the idea of a methodology of accounting for the theory in *CRP* (B) that starts from the changes in the B edition and refers to our reconstruction in *The Experiment...*. The fundamental idea of this study relates Kant’s own requirements and

explanations concerning the necessity of a second edition of *CRP* with the disclosure of an inapparent underlying evolution of Kant's thought that transpires during the time between the two editions of the *Critique*, and may be uncovered through an unitary understanding of both two of his „mediatory” works (*Prolegomena* and *MANW*) and the two editions of *CRP*. Besides Kant's own clarifications, these two works may be considered as true steps that the *CRP* project takes towards the construction of the mature theory in *CRP* (B): in both *Prolegomena* and *MANW* there are some outgrowths that are also to be found in *CRP* (B) – outgrowths that (highly important) were not addressed by the kantian exegetics until our book in a way that the transcendental deduction as a whole attains its validity (this major achievement is reproduced in the habilitation thesis *as such*).

In our second book, *Kantian Problems in Contemporary Epistemology* (2016), there are some applications of the main ideas of the *Experiment...* regarding some problems of contemporary epistemology (published and unpublished papers gathered systematically): the transcendental philosophy does not address scepticism, not directly, anyway; the problems of the *Critique* are different than those of the logic empiricism (for a thorough analysis you may see my papers *An Epistemological Perspective Regarding Kant's View of Scepticism* and *Kant's Response to Hume*).

In *A Kuhnian Reconstruction of Kant's Concept of «Copernican Revolution»* (2013), we have considered that, through his „frame-theory” of the *Critique*, Immanuel Kant had accomplished, for classical metaphysics in general, something analogous to what Thomas Kuhn had accomplished in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* with respect to the status of certainty of the scientific theories: while the *Structure...* tells us that the model of „revolutionary science” addresses those problems that „normal science” is no longer able to solve, in the same way, the *Critique* indicates that problems should be redesigned, and provides solutions from the general viewpoint of the „frame-theory” as a whole.

In this study, we have shown that the story of the *Critique* tells us something about the destiny of any „revolutionary science”: the fact that, because they did not understand the Kantian theory, Kant's fellows had rejected the philosophy of the *Critique* (from the *A* edition) – Kuhnian incommensurability; the limits of the philosophical language in classical metaphysics, etc. All these elements constitute precisely what we actually understand by the

phrase „the changing in the way of thinking” (*Gestalt* – Kuhn) with respect to the old metaphysics.

The idea that the relation with the object is made from a different level of abstraction than the logical empiricism can provide is easy to establish from what we said before as well as the idea that in front of our consciousness is not to be found „the thing as such” (i.e., a perfectly compatible view with Kuhn’s perspective in his *Structure...*). The same idea rises from the two subsequent studies (*Darwinism and some epistemological consequences*, *A Criticism of Theleological Reasoning in Evolutionary Biology and Creationism*) of my second book, and more recently from my piece *Recent Accounts on Kant’s Concept of Theleology*.

Our main focus in this paper was to try an „application” of the theleology idea from a kantian perspective, but related with the idea of evolution in general (*Darwinism and some epistemological consequences*) and with the „idea of function” within evolutionary biology (*A Criticism of Theleological Reasoning in Evolutionary Biology and Creationism*) and with a kantian perspective as Hannah Ginsborg (wrongly) sees it (*Recent Accounts on Kant’s Concept of Theleology*).

In our paper *A Kantian Interpretation of Noica’s Concept of „Wave” in his „27 Steps of Reality”* we have attempted to see Noica’s piece, as the title itself suggests it, through the kantian „experiment of pure reason”, and also to outline some kind of „pattern” of this particular model that is to be found in the Romanian philosopher’s work. Secondly, approaching Noica’s paper (one almost disregarded by the exegetics) we now learn that the state of categorical frame of philosophy requires a strong action of reviews, because of the counterintuitively and even paradoxically features of the last century’s findings in hard sciences. As we saw it, this kantian perspective provided by Noica *without even knowing it*, meets perfectly our view on kantian experiment of pure reason, as we developed it in *The Experiment...* This is one of the facts that encouraged us to consider the structure of the „experiment of pure reason” as a kind of model or „pattern”, whose potential and wealth of shades are still to be discover.

The next two studies (*A Philosophical Perspective Regarding Significance of Myth and The Philosophy of Religion – Conceptual Inquiries*) are also underlied by the same idea that is to be found in our previous texts. An account on how knowledge is possible in general

requires a resolution also with respect to topics that apparently are free of the methodological frame assumed in our main researches. The religious phenomenon, the fundamental mythological representation (designed by the cosmogonic myth) are not rejected by our epistemological account nor considered as redundant: on the contrary, against the extremist („scientist”) viewpoint, we have tried to show that these topics are not only actual, but are a legitimate phenomena that can be investigated most fruitfully with philosophical tools.

Regarding the future plans of evolution and development of my professional, scientific and academic career, as well as the research perspectives and the suitable ways of action, in their dedicated section, we will briefly present the most recent studies related to these future perspectives.

For instance, studies like *On Continuum Principle in Aristotle and Leibniz*, *On Kant's Critique's Concept of Infinite*, *On the Concept of Axioma in Transcendental Analytics*, and the text of my ongoing research that will be in print soon (*Notes on the Concept of Function in Mathematics*) show a link between the realm of philosophy and the realm of the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science. This approach, as *our* „experiment of pure reason” teaches us, will constitute an inquiry that aims to set a new frame of philosophical categories that reflect the core of the outcomes of contemporary sciences. From that point of view, we will focus on the future features of what we *call* today the concept of cause-effect, relation, time-space, reality, etc. These ways will be sustained by constant researches in hard sciences fields like mathematics, theoretical physics etc., by attending to scientific conferences or working on projects of multidisciplinary research-teams, etc.

I should also add here briefly some of my original scientific contributions that are highly relevant for the area of philosophical research that constitutes my field of interest and inquiry: 2 books as a single author published at national prestigious publishing houses (Editura Academiei Române, Editura Grinta, CNCSIS accredited); editing (with Professor Alexandru Boboc, member of the Romanian Academy) a major philosophical work – Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*; editing 8 collective volumes on epistemology and philosophy of science; 4 studies published in philosophical journals indexed in international accredited databases (2 of them ISI Web of Knowledge); over 20 studies published in philosophical journals CNCSIS accredited or in collective volumes published at national prestigious

publishing houses; over 25 conferences in national and international congresses; contributing to research projects developed within the Institute of Philosophy and Psychology of the Romanian Academy, and participating as a researcher at a Grant within the same institution, etc.